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Abstract. A drive-by download is a download that occurs without users
action or knowledge. It usually triggers an exploit of vulnerability in a
browser to downloads an unknown file. The malicious program in the
downloaded file installs itself on the victims machine. Moreover, the
downloaded file can be camouflaged as an installer that would further
install malicious software. Drive-by downloads is a very good example of
the exponential increase in malicious activity over the Internet and how it
affects the daily use of the web. In this paper, we try to address the prob-
lem caused by drive-by downloads from different standpoints. We provide
in-depth understanding of the difficulties in dealing with drive-by down-
loads and suggest appropriate solutions. We propose machine learning
and feature selection solutions to remedy the drive-by download prob-
lem. Experimental results reported 98.2% precision, 98.2% F-Measure
and 97.2% ROC area.
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1 Introduction
Miscreants make use of malicious web content to perform attacks targeting web
clients. Drive-by downloads (DBD) are unintentional downloads of malware or
virus on to a mobile device or a computer. Due to the increased population of
several web applications, DBD have become one of the most common malware
spreading methods, thereby leading the security threats to cyber community.
According to [29], query search results from Google contain more than 1.3% of
the web pages that do DBD attacks. These downloads are located on normal-
looking, but malicious websites [4]. They exploit vulnerabilities in out-of-date
apps, browsers, plugins, or operating systems. Over the years, hackers have be-
come much more sophisticated that just opening such web page could allow
malicious code to be installed on the device without the knowledge and consent
of the user. Downloaded malware takes complete control of the victims platform
[13]. Once the attacker gets full control, he can download and execute any code
and run malicious activities on the victim’s platform such as joining botnets,
sending spam emails, and participating in distributed denial of service attacks
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[14]. Attackers may also record keystrokes, steal passwords, and can access sen-
sitive information. Use of DBD to steal confidential data is also a major threat
to the financial companies and banks.
A DBD attack occurs in four steps. First, the attacker compromises a genuine
website and uploads malicious content to it. When a user visits that website, the
malicious program is downloaded by browser, installed by itself, and the attacker
gets full control [14]. APT programs and methods used by cybercriminal groups
to attack businesses make them more dangerous.
In 2015, almost two million cases of malware infections to steal money were
registered, while 34.2 % of computer users were exposed to at least one such
attack through the year [12]. In order to ensure protection against such attack,
there is a vital need for new methods and technologies that can safeguard the
users from DBD attacks [31]. There are couple of existing techniques to detect
and prevent such attacks. The detection of attacks can be performed by tracking
web addresses with a history of malicious behavior [29]. According to Microsoft,
Bing normally detects huge numbers of DBD pages every month. However, after
getting blocked by Bing, the attackers switch servers and thus the same attacks
are reborn but with different domain names [33]. Intrusion detection systems
monitor traffic and system activities and may be used to detect attacks [7].
In order to counter the innovative tactics employed by the hackers, there is
a vital need to develop efficient techniques that could potentially counter DBD
attacks. In this paper, we proposed a novel design, which uses machine learning
to detect and prevent DBD attacks. We selected nine attributes from a dataset
of benign URLs from University of California Irvine (UCI) machine learning
repository and malicious URLs from malware domain list [5]. Each attribute
was chosen carefully to measure its effectiveness on different characteristics of
malicious URLs. Furthermore, we employed several machine learning models
for the training the system to detect malicious URLs. However, after empirical
performance evaluation of these models, we selected Naive Bayes (NB), JRip,
and J48 classifiers.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 contains the related
work. Section 3 describes the methodology. Results are discussed in section 4
and section 5 concludes our work.
2 Related Work
Below we classify the most relevant work on detecting DBDs.
2.1 Using web crawler to detect drive by downloads
Harley and Pierre-Marc work does not offer a solution to DBDs, but tries to
provoke more research in the area by suggesting possible ideas [15]. It provokes
researchers to pay more attention to attacks that are large scale in nature and
which do not use codes that are self-propagating. This is because current attacks
are sophisticated and, therefore, a long-lasting solution may be one that uses
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the fault-tolerant and robust software in addition to ensuring the monitoring of
web pages. A web crawler can be used to identify distribution points, however,
due to the complexity of this detection, false positives risks can be lessened
by either digital signing or obfuscating techniques can be avoided. Some of the
characteristics of this web crawler would be; ability to analyze HTML pages as
well as follows its links; ability to imitate web cookies; ability to imitate scripting
languages in order to decode obfuscated code; and ability to use heuristics in the
detection of possible exploits in web pages. It concludes that measures, which
are semi-effective and multi-layered, and those that accept specific risks of both
false positives and negatives offer much protection.
2.2 Antivirus software to detect drive-by downloads malware
Narvaez et al., studied how antivirus software can be useful in the detection of
drive-by malware installation by studying the effectiveness of the current an-
tivirus tools [27]. A sample of malware was collected by use of a honeypot. The
sample of the malware was categorized into whether the malware used either
delivered payload or downloader. An evaluation of the results was made by com-
mon antivirus software to determine their effectiveness in detecting exploits.
After 30days, the sample of the malware was scanned again as it was expected
that the antivirus would have made an update of signature databases. According
to the initial results, Norton detected 66% of the collected malware, Kaspersky
91%, CA 61%, ClamWin 62% [9] and TrendMicro 69% [22]. The next scan, after
30days, showed an increase in the rate of detection with Norton having 90%,
Kaspersky 98%, TrendMicro 70%, ClamWin 75% and CA 81%. However, even
though there was an improvement in the second scan, signature-based antivirus
may not perform well in reality. This is because just as they had an opportu-
nity to perform an update on their signatures similarly would attackers update
malware. The initial detection, which was low, shows that malware authors use
polymorphic capabilities. In 84% of attacks, downloaders are used instead of
payloads. Antivirus products struggle to keep their signature databases up to
date with the continuously changing threat landscape [32].
2.3 BrowserGuard as a behavior-based solution
Hsu et al. [17] proposed a behavior-based BrowserGuard, which detects secret
downloads and blocks the malware from being executed. BrowserGuard uses
two phases to provide protection to its host. The first is the filtration phase,
whereby BrowserGuard makes a distinction between malicious and benign files
depending on the situations in which they are downloaded. The second is the
prohibition phase, whereby a request for the execution of malicious files is denied.
In order to test the technique in terms of false positives, BrowserGuard visited
the 500 top-ranked websites from Alexa. As expected BrowserGuard did not issue
any attack alert, therefore, BrowserGuard had zero false positives. To measure
the false negatives, Metasploit framework was used to generate ten malicious
web pages that are then hosted on a remote server. BrowserGuard blocked all
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ten pages, therefore, the authors claimed zero false negatives. To assess the
performance overhead of BrowserGuard, the time to download fives web page,
from Alexa, was measured 2000 times. BrowserGuard introduced a fixed delays
time and the worst performance overhead was 2.5%. Unfortunately, we believe
the test samples are insufficient to support the conclusions and BrowserGuard
only works for Windows Internet Explorer 7.0.
2.4 A framework for DBD attacks with users voluntary monitoring
of the web
Matsunaka et al. [24] proposed participative monitoring framework that fights
DBDs with voluntary monitoring of websites by users and expert analysts. The
framework provided a security ecosystem whereby users allow monitoring of
their web activities, while security analysts do an inspection of the information
in order to detect threats, devise countermeasures and provide feedback to the
users. The framework enables users to provide data via the sensors and security
analysts to give feedback through analyzing the data available at the center. The
sensors are located in web proxies, DNS servers, and web browsers. Additionally,
a web crawler was used to inspect web pages that are suspicious. The real-time
data enabled the framework to previously detect unknown malicious web pages.
However, advertisement hosts can cause false positives and further work is needed
to address that.
2.5 HTML and JavaScript feature for detecting the drive-by
download
Priya et al. [28] provided a static approach to the detect DBDs using JavaScript
and HTML features [28]. A sample dataset was created with 311 malicious URLs,
from www.malwaredomainlist.com, and 654 benign URLs from Alexa were used
to test different classifiers. To view the source code of benign sites you just
open the URL, however, opening a malicious web page is a problem because
it will cause malware to be installed on the computer. Therefore, MATLAB
parser was developed to extract the malicious source code without visiting and
executing the code. The HTML code was parsed and JavaScript and HTML
features were extracted.They used both WEKA and MATLAB to evaluate the
classifiers performance with 92% best case detection accuracy.
2.6 Approach to detect drive-by download based on characters
Matsunaka et al. [23] proposed FCDBD that includes monitoring sensors on the
client side and analysis center on the network. The sensors include web browsers,
web sensors or DNS sensors. The browser sensors extracted the user’s data while
DNS and web sensors monitored DNS-/HTTP- related traffic [3]. The analysis
center collects the logs and analyzes them, if malicious websites are detected,
the information is reported to monitoring sensors so the users may not access
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the websites. The approach was evaluated using D3M 2013 dataset. According
to the results, false positives only occur when a transition of a sequence of web
pages is terminated before the malware is downloaded. To compensate for that,
advertisement or affiliates scripts are obfuscated and referrer field is empty.
2.7 Enhanced approach for malware downloading:
Adachi et al. [1] used two approaches to predict DBD through opcode and vul-
nerability evaluation. The first approach identified vulnerabilities CVE-IDs in
the web pages to predict the of malware download. For analysis, Wepawet was
employed to identify CVE-IDs in the web pages, and the National Vulnerability
Database (NVD) provided information concerning the CVEs. To improve detec-
tion rates they are reduced unnecessary information by a grouping algorithm
[26]. Features were then extracted and the prediction model computed malware-
downloading probabilities. The second approach combined opcode with the first
approach one because opcode by itself fails to detect attacks that do not use
JavaScript. Pages from 2011-2014 D3M datasets and AlexaTop500 were used.
The first approach had 83% prediction accuracy and low FPs rate, however it
had high FNs rate. The second approach had a 92% prediction accuracy, 11%
FNs and 6% FPs using Random Forest.
2.8 Analyze redirection code for mining URLs:
Takata et al. [30] MineSpider performed an analysis on JavaScripts that include
browser fingerprinting and redirection code and extracted possible URLs through
the execution of the redirection code. MineSpider applied program slicing to
JavaScript in order to extract execution paths, the extracted code fragments are
executed by an interpreter and URLs are extracted. The outcome is just URL
extraction and no detection was done. However, the URLs extracted by this
method can be analyzed for malice using other approaches. MineSpider could
extract more than 30,000 URLs in seconds compared to other methods.
2.9 Visualize the flow of HTTP traffic
Kikuchi et al. [20] used decision trees to classify DBDs by using features such
as object size and redirection methods. The first premise was that many code
variations modify words that are user-defined without the structure of the script
being affected. Second, the characteristics of the scripts do not protect from
DBDs because of disguised transformations fabrication. Additionally, they used
the prediction of latent behavior to detect large-scale DBDs by using the drive-
by disclosure method, which bridges the gap in between static and dynamic ap-
proaches. The method captured models and learned latent behaviors as opposed
to scanning web pages for content that is malicious. To evaluate the efficiency of
the approach 50 malicious and 50 legitimate sessions were obtained from Alexa.
It was found that the method had no false positives but had 0.06 chance of false
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negatives. The results showed that drive-by exposure can filter out scripts that
are benign in nature, detect malicious scripts, and detect a variety of obfuscated
patterns of DBDs as well as sort-out scripts that are disguised. In comparison
to other high-tech solutions, drive-by disclosure was doubling accurate when
compared to Cujo and it outdid JSAND by 29%.
2.10 Drive-by download as a large scale web attacks
Jodavi et al. drive-by disclosure [2] used anomaly DbD hunter approach to train
and detect using a collection of classifiers. In the training stage, inputs of be-
nign web pages are run in a browser. Then, JavaScript byte codes are logged
for the web pages and a feature vector generated for the sequence. The feature
vectors are then used to construct the classifiers baseline. The detection stage
involved logging JavaScript byte codes for web pages, after which a feature vec-
tor is generated and applied to all base classifiers. The detection performance
of DbD hunter was evaluated and was found that it increased the rate of detec-
tion by 12.44%, while decreasing rates of false alarms by approximately 48.13%.
It had an accuracy of 97%, a detection rate of 96.3% and false alarm rate of
1.8%. Anomaly detection approach [8] have been used to detect DBD. Accord-
ing to [19], attacks by DBDs make use of browser exploit packs (BEPs) that
are deployed on compromised servers to spread malware. BEPs that are widely
used include sweet orange, Black Hole, Angler, Nuclear, Sakura, Fiesta, Hunter,
Magnitude and Styx. The study makes an analysis of features that are built-in,
which allow successful attacks by DBDs. The study conclude that just as attacks
by DBDs increase in sophistication, so should the solutions.
3 Methodology
We develop a novel mechanism to counter DBD attacks that employs machine
learning techniques. The proposed mechanism is able to classify the URLs into
benign and malicious categories accurately.The benign category refers to web-
sites that are safe, whereas the malicious category relates to the websites created
by attackers to gain access or retrieve sensitive information. We used Waikato
Environment for Knowledge Analysis (WEKA) [16] to classify the URLs based
on different attributes using machine learning based models. WEKA is a popu-
lar machine learning suite developed at the University of Waikato, New Zealand
and is licensed under the GNU General Public License (GPL). It contains ma-
chine learning algorithms for data mining related tasks. Integration feature helps
to integrate these algorithms with the application code. It also supports data
pre-processing, classification, regression, clustering, association rules, and visu-
alization. The following subsection summarize the methodology used to classify
DBDs and evaluate the performance.
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3.1 dataset
We collected benign URLs from open source UCI Machine Learning Repository
[21] and we used a list of 63 updated malware and spyware URLs from Malware
Domain List [25].
3.2 Feature selection
Feature selection, also known as variable selection or attribute selection, is a
process to select relevant features from predictive models. Each instance of the
dataset used by machine learning algorithms is represented by the same set of
features. These features can be continuous, categorical, or binary. We selected
multiple effective features to build our proposed model. Given a single URL, its
features were extracted and categorized into eight attributes (plus class) that
were used by WEKA as itemized below.
– HostRank: the URLs global Amazon Alexa ranking [10]
– CountryRank: the URLs Amazon Alexa website rank by country [11]
– ASNNumber: The autonomous system number (ASN), which is assigned to
the URLs domain, and used in BGP routing. [18]
– DotsInURL: number of dots in URLs [6],
– Lenghthofurl: length of the URL,
– IPaddresss: is the host name using ip address rather than name address,
– Lengthofhostname: length of host name,
– Safe Browsing: rating of Google safe browsing.
Two attribute evaluators: Correlation Attributes Evaluation (CAE) and In-
formation Gain Attributes (IG) have been used on the dataset. Correlation At-
tributes Evaluation is used to choose best attributes for model training. It mea-
sures the correlation between attribute and the class and evaluates its worth.
Information Gain picks attributes by measuring IG with respect to the class. For
this work, eight features were selected to be used with WEKA. Referring to the
figure 1, most of the attributes have scored a high ranking except IPaddress and
ASNnumber for which, IG was 0.0521 and 0.1691, respectively. On the CAE,
the IPaddress and ASNnumber scored 0.247 and 0.148, which are the lowest
scores in the precision test. Thus, these two attributes were eliminated from the
attribute set. We finalized six features that include Host Rank, Country Rank,
Dots in URL, Length of the URL, length of the host name, in addition to the
class: malicious or benign.
3.3 Classification
Many classifiers were chosen to train on the selected dataset, however, NB, JRip,
and J48 outperformed all others. Therefore, we experimentally determined that
those three are the best classifiers based on their performance on a given dataset.
To evaluate the trained model, we employed 10 folds cross validation. Cross-
validation is a technique to evaluate predictive models by splitting the original
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Fig. 1. Information Gain and Correlation Ranking Attributes Ranking
dataset sample into a training and test sets to train and evaluate the model
respectively. The process is repeated k times, with each of the k sub-samples
used exactly once as the validation data. For this problem, data was split into
10 sets of size n/10, training with 9 subsets and testing on the remaining one
subset. This process was repeated ten times while using a different subset for
the test each time. The final results were then calculated by taking the mean
accuracy of ten tests.
4 Results
Figure 2 shows the comparison of each classifier for malicious, benign, and aver-
age instance by using precision metric. We observed that NB scored 97% Mali-
cious, 99% Benign, and 98% Average whereas JRip scored 97% Malicious, 99%
Benign and 98% Average. Finally, J48 scored 95% Malicious, 97% Benign and
96% Average. Among all the three classifiers, the J48 scored the lowest with the
average score of 96%. Naive Bayes and JRip have scored the highest in the tests,
with similar results of average being 98%. Therefore, NB and JRip classifiers are
used in the following analysis.
4.1 Metrics
Confusion matrix The confusion matrix summarizes the performance of clas-
sification model. True Positive (TP), False Negative (FN), False Positive (FP),
and True Negative (TN) are elements of confusion matrix as shown in Figure
3. Columns represent the predicted class while rows represent the actual class.
Higher values in the main diagonal reflect better accuracy in the classification.
True positive rate A true positive rate is the proportion of positives that are
correctly identified by classifier. The TP rate is defined as follows.
TPRate =
TP
TP + FN
(1)
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Fig. 2. Precision of different classifiers
Fig. 3. Confusion matrix
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False positive rate A False Positive rate is the proportion of the outcome that
is incorrectly predicted as yes (or positive) when it is actually no (negative).The
FP rate is defined as follows.
FPRate =
FP
FP + TN
(2)
Precision precision is the fraction of relevant instances among the retrieved
instances.
Precision =
TP
TP + FP
(3)
Recall Recall is the fraction of relevant instances among the retrieved instances.
Recall =
TP
TP + FN
(4)
F-measure The F-measure is defined as a harmonic mean of precision and
recall.
Precision =
2xPrecisionxRecall
Recall + Precision
(5)
Matthews correlation coefficient (MCC) MCC ranges from 1.0 (worst)
to 1.0 (best) and is defined as follows.
MCC =
(TPxTN)− (FPxFN)√
(TP + FP )(TP + FN)(TN + FP )(TN + FN)
(6)
4.2 Naive Bayes
Table 1. Naive Bayes classifier results
Malware Benign Average
TPR 98.40% 98% 98.20%
FPR 2% 1.60% 1.70%
Precision 96.90% 99% 98.20%
Recall 98.40% 98% 98.20%
F-Measure 97.60% 98.50% 98.20%
MCC 96.20% 96.20% 96.20%
ROC Area 98.70% 99.50% 99.20%
PRC Area 96% 99.70% 98.30%
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The results of the NB classifier are shown in Table 1. The average score of
TP is 98.20%, which indicates that the attributes have been correctly identified.
The FP averaged 1.70%, which indicates that the result is scoring low on the
error scale of the attributes. Therefore, the results can be identified as viable and
true in this test. Table 2 shows the confusion matrix containing the details of
the predicted and actual classes done by the NB classifier. Using these numbers
we can calculate the TP and FP rates.
Table 2. Confusion Matrix Naive Bayes
a=Malicious b=Benign
a=Malicious 61 2
b=Benign 1 100
Applying formula 1 and 2 to the confusion matrix of NB, we get the following
results.
TPRate =
61
61 + 2
= 0.968 (7)
FPRate =
1
1 + 100
= 0.009 (8)
4.3 JRIP
Table 3 shows that average TP of 98.20%, which indicates that JRip is able to
correctly classify the URLs. The FP score is 1.70%, which indicates the classifi-
cation had a low number of errors.
Table 3. JRip classifier results
Malware Benign Average
TPR 98.40% 98% 98.20%
FPR 2% 1.60% 1.70%
Precision 90.60% 99% 98.20%
Recall 98.40% 98% 98.20%
F-Measure 97.60% 98.50% 98.20%
MCC 96.20% 96.20% 96.20%
ROC Area 97.20% 97.20% 97.20%
PRC Area 92.80% 98% 96%
In Table 4 the confusion matrix is presented, which contains the details about
the predicted and actual classification done by the JRip classifier. The count of
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Table 4. Confusion Matrix JRip
a=Malicious b=Benign
a=Malicious 62 1
b=Benign 1 100
TP is 62, FN is 1, and FP is 1 whereas TN is equal to 100. Using these numbers
we can calculate the TP rate and FP rate.
TPRate =
62
62 + 1
= 0.984 (9)
FPRate =
1
1 + 100
= 0.009 (10)
4.4 J48
From Table 5, we can deduce that the average TP is 96.30%, which indicates
that most of the URLs are correctly classified. The FP score is 4.10%, which
indicates that the classification had a low number of errors.
Table 5. J48 classifier results
Malware Benign Average
TPR 95.20% 97% 96.30%
FPR 3% 4.80% 4.10%
Precision 95.20% 97% 96.30%
Recall 95.20% 97% 96.30%
F-Measure 95.20% 97% 96.30%
MCC 92.30% 92.30% 92.30%
ROC Area 95.60% 95.60% 95.60%
PRC Area 91.60% 96.10% 94.40%
Table 6 shows the confusion matrix, which contains the details about the
predicted and actual classification done by the J48 classifier. Using these numbers
we can calculate the TP rate and FP rate.
Table 6. Confusion Matrix J48
a=Malicious b=Benign
a=Malicious 60 3
b=Benign 3 98
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TPRate =
60
60 + 3
= 0.952 (11)
FPRate =
3
3 + 98
= 0.029 (12)
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed an approach to filter benign and malicious websites.
The URL based analysis is performed that helped by removing the runtime la-
tency and delay of loading the websites. Furthermore, the proposed design pro-
tects the users from attacks induced by browser vulnerabilities. The proposed
approach can be applied via a blacklisting content and system-based evaluation
of site content and behavior of the site. By selecting the right features and algo-
rithms, our system has achieved 98% accuracy in detecting and classifying the
malicious URLs. The limitation of the work include the small dataset, number of
classifiers used and actual real time testing. Future work would include creating
a browser plugin and testing the system with real data, using a much larger
dataset and investigating deep learning methods.
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